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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
ExxonMobil has requested refunds of severance taxes based on the correct
interpretation of applicable severance tax laws. ExxonMobil believes it is entitled to
these refunds because, when this Court interpreted the statutes in question, it held that "as
to all but ExxonMobil the rule announced today is to have prospective application only."
ExxonMobil Corp, v. Utah State Tax Comm% 2003 UT 53, % 23, 86 P.3d 706, 712.
ExxonMobil believes that the Commission's refusal to issue the refunds ignores this
Court's ruling that the prospective effect limitation applied to "other parties" besides
ExxonMobil. Id., ^24. Alternatively, ExxonMobil has asked this Court to reverse the
prospective effect limitation because (1) the ExxonMobil decision did not create new law;
and (2) the ExxonMobil Court's determination that refunds "would pose a great burden"
was based on erroneous assumptions and allegations.
The Commission claims that it correctly interpreted ExxonMobil and that the
prospective relief granted to ExxonMobil was limited to the claims before the
ExxonMobil Court in 2003. In response to ExxonMobil's request for reversal of the
prospective relief limitation, the Commission alleges that the threshold requirement that a
decision create "new law" does not apply and that courts have nearly unfettered discretion
to refuse to retroactively apply decisions in matters of statutory interpretation.
Commission's Brief, p. 24. The Amici Funds oppose reversal of the prospective relief
limitation claiming that the limitation was imposed in accordance with established

1

precedent and that its reversal would result in a windfall to the taxpayers and would
irreparably damage the Amici Funds.1 These allegations are incorrect and not supported
by the record.
This Court's unprecedented decision to give prospective effect to a decision which
did not establish new law has been interpreted by the Commission to authorize millions of
dollars in deficiency assessments against taxpayers who had paid their taxes based on the
correct interpretation of the severance tax statutes. ExxonMobil has warned that the
ExxonMobil precedent will ensure that, when an agency's persistent misinterpretation of a
statute is corrected, the agency can request a prospective relief limitation and, on the
strength of that limitation, retroactively enforce its misinterpretation. Neither the
Commission nor the Amici Funds have denied that this is exactly what occurred after the
ExxonMobil Court imposed the prospective relief limitation. If this Court does not
reverse that limitation, then the meaning of a statute is determined by an agency until this
Court rules on the correct interpretation. This result suspends the role of the legislature in
creating laws until this Court provides the correct interpretation. Until then, an agency is
free to misinterpret and misapply law with the added assurance that its misinterpretation
will be enforceable until the day the Court corrects the agency's misinterpretation. The

1

Amici Uintah Basin Revitalization Fund and Navajo Revitalization Fund
(collectively "Amici Funds") have filed a brief opposing ExxonMobil's request that the
Court reverse the ExxonMobil prospective relief limitation. The Amici Funds' Brief does
not address the first issues raised by ExxonMobil's appeal- that the Commission erred
when it narrowly interpreted the scope of the prospective relief limitation.
2

Commission has not denied that this outcome can only be prevented by reversal of the
prospective relief limitation in ExxonMobil.
ARGUMENT
I.

EXXONMOBIL IS ENTITLED TO THE REQUESTED REFUNDS UNDER
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE EXXONMOBIL DECISION.
In its Opening Brief, ExxonMobil2 explained that, when a court fashions a

prospective relief limitation it has 'Various available options" which include giving
"limited retroactivity to all parties on direct appeal" or "only to the case in which the new
principle is announced and to those cases initiated in the future." ExxonMobil's Opening
Brief, p. 14, quoting Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm % 862 P.2d 1348, 1350
(Utah 1993); In re Twin Parks Ltd. Partnership, 720 F.2d 1374, 1376 (4th Cir. 1983); and
RioAlgom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184, 196 (Utah 1984).
The Commission has taken the position that the ExxonMobil prospective relief
limitation "only applies to the claims presented" in 2003 to the ExxonMobil Court. The
Commission argues that the Court has never expanded selective prospectivity to include
claims not before it and, therefore, such an interpretation cannot be permitted in this case.
The Commission's response is wrong for several reasons. First, the scope of a
prospective relief limitation is established by the Court's plain language which, in this
case, would permit additional claims by ExxonMobil and MEPNA. Kennecott, 862 P.2d

2

Petitioners ExxonMobil and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Mobil Exploration and
Producing ("MEPNA"), are collectively referred to herein as "ExxonMobil."
3

at 1350. Second, contrary to the Commission's claim, this Court has fashioned
prospective relief limitations which permit retroactive application of a new rule to claims
not raised by the original complaint. The scope of a prospective relief limitation is
established on a case-by-case basis and the limitation imposed by the ExxonMobil Court
is not presumed to be the same as the limitations imposed by the Court in other cases.
Third, the Commission's characterization of ExxonMobil's interpretation as "expanding
the remand order of the Court" is wrong. Finally, the Commission's claim that its
interpretation furthers the Court's stated judicial policy is an ineffective response to the
concerns raised by ExxonMobil. The Commission did not respond to ExxonMobil's
discussion regarding the errors underlying that policy and it ignores the fact that the Court
had already weighed its concerns against ExxonMobil's right to relief and concluded that
the prospective relief limitation would not apply to ExxonMobil.
A.

The Plain Language of the ExxonMobil Decision Supports the
Application of the Correct Interpretation of the Severance Tax
Provisions to the Refund Requests by ExxonMobil.

The Commission's interpretation of the prospective relief limitation is based
entirely on the ExxonMobil Court's statement remanding the claims before it for "further
adjudication." ExxonMobil, % 24. According to the Commission, the Court's reference to
those claims must be interpreted as establishing the entire scope of the Court's retroactive
relief even though the Court clearly stated that "whether in refund requests or deficiency

4

proceedings, as to all but ExxonMobil, the rule announced today is to have prospective
application only." Id, % 23 (emphasis added).
In Kennecott, this Court recognized that it had 'Various available options" for
fashioning a prospective relief limitation, including "giv[ing] the holding retroactive
effect as to the litigants or others who have litigation pending." 862 P.2d at 1350, quoting
Rio Algom, 681 P.2d at 196. The plain language of the ExxonMobil prospective relief
limitation denied retroactive effect "as to all but ExxonMobil." ExxonMobil, ^ 23. The
Commission's dependence on the Court's remand of the claims before it as establishing
the scope of the limitation, ignores the subsequent articulation of the limitation by the
Court as applying only to "other parties" besides ExxonMobil. The Commission fails to
explain how the Court's refusal to apply the ExxonMobil decision to "otherparties who
may have refund requests, deficiency proceedings, or similar matters pending before the
Tax Commission" forbids any additional claims by ExxonMobil, the only party to which
the prospective relief limitation does not apply. Id. Tf 24 (emphasis added).
In its Opening Brief, ExxonMobil supported its interpretation of the prospective
relief limitation by showing that the Division had given the same interpretation to the
plain language of the prospective relief limitation until January 18, 2008. Opening Brief,
p. 15, n. 5 (Division Manager testified that MEPNA's 1999 refund request was approved
because the Division believed ExxonMobil permitted additional claims, see R. 88:11-16).
In its Response, the Commission has ignored the fact that the Division interpreted the

5

prospective relief limitation to authorize additional refunds, as well as the Commission's
own acknowledgment that language within the ExxonMobil decision could "be interpreted
to allow other claims by ExxonMobil." Id, p. 19, citing Order, p. 11 (R. 519).
The plain language used by the ExxonMobil Court to define the scope of the
prospective relief limitation clearly established that ExxonMobil could not be denied the
right to rely on the correct interpretation of the severance tax provisions. The Division's
interpretation of that language (until January 2008) as permitting additional relief
supports the finding that the ExxonMobil Court's plain language permitted retroactive
application of the decision to ExxonMobil. The Commission exceeded its authority when
it "interpreted] the Court's retroactive application narrowly," and refused to retroactively
apply the ExxonMobil decision to ExxonMobil. Order, p. 10 (R. 518).
B.

The Scope of The Prospective Relief Limitation Is Unique in Every
Case And, in this Case, it Permits ExxonMobil to Bring Additional
Refund Claims.

The Commission argues that the prospective relief limitation bars ExxonMobil's
claims because, according to the Commission, this Court has never imposed a prospective
relief limitation which permits parties to pursue claims which had not been pending at the
time the limitation was imposed. Commission's Brief, pp. 14-16. In support of this
claim, the Commission mischaracterizes this Court's holding in V-l Oil Co. v. Utah State
Tax Comm % 942 P.2d 906 (Utah 1996), vacated on rehearing, 942 P.2d 906 (Utah
1997), stating that the decision was applied "retroactively to the claims of

6

unconstitutionality raised before the Court and prospectively to all other claims." Id.,
p. 15.
In V-1 Oil, the taxpayer filed its complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief in
March 1994. The Court issued its decision on October 29, 1996. The V-1 Court
specifically held that its decision "is retroactive to the year in which V-1 alleges it began
to pay the surcharge subject only to any applicable statutes of limitation." 942 P.2d at
915. The Court's decision to grant retroactive relief to V-1 for all claims not barred by
the statute of limitations would have allowed V-1 to obtain refiinds for surcharges paid on
motor fuels after it had filed the complaint, including payments made before the Court
issued its decision.
Just as the V-1 Court's prospective relief limitation would have allowed V-1 to
obtain refunds for tax overpayments which had yet not occurred when the original
complaint was filed, the ExxonMobil Court also fashioned a prospective relief limitation
which permitted ExxonMobil to pursue its refund requests for severance tax
overpayments which were not part of the original ExxonMobil proceeding.
In every case in which this Court has imposed a prospective relief limitation, that
limitation is crafted in response to the unique set of circumstances which exist in each
case. Kennecott, 862 P.2d at 1350 (In adopting a prospective relief limitation, court has
"various available options"); In re Twin Parks Ltd, Partnership, 720 F.2d at 1376
("Tribunals announcing new principles of law, however, qualify their retroactivity in
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differing ways, and the new principles' effect on cases then existing in various stages of
litigation differ accordingly

Ultimately, the prospective or retroactive effects of a

new rule depend upon the enunciating court's intention."). The Commission's claim that
all prospective relief limitations imposed by this Court have the same parameters is
simply wrong and provides no basis to interpret the ExxonMobil prospective relief
limitation as advocated by the Commission.
C.

ExxonMobil Has Not Asked the Court to "Expand the Remand Order
of the Court."

The Commission claims it was powerless to provide the relief requested by
ExxonMobil because it would have been expanding the Court's order to remand the claim
before it. Ironically, it is the Commission which has departed from the scope of that
Order when, by its own admission, it "interpreted] the Court's retroactive application
narrowly." Order, p. 10 (R. 518)(emphasis added).
The order of remand referred to by the Commission consists of the following
statement by the ExxonMobil Court:
Although ExxonMobil is entitled to further adjudication of its claim for a
refund, as to other parties who may have refund requests, deficiency
proceedings, or similar matters pending before the Tax Commission, our
holding is to apply prospectively only.
ExxonMobil, \ 24. Pursuant to that Order, a hearing was held before the Commission
after which the Commission determined that ExxonMobil was entitled to refunds for
severance taxes paid by MEPNA from 1993 through 1998.
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The Commission's claim that ExxonMobil's interpretation of the prospective relief
limitation would expand the Court's remand order makes no sense. The order remanding
the claims before the ExxonMobil Court is not a limitation on the retroactive application
of the ExxonMobil decision. There is no language in that remand order to suggest that the
refund claims before the ExxonMobil Court were the only claims to which the
ExxonMobil decision could be retroactively applied. To the contrary, when declaring the
prospective application of the ExxonMobil decision, the Court singled out ExxonMobil as
being entirely exempt from that restriction:
Thus, whether in refund requests or deficiency proceedings, as to all but
ExxonMobil the rule announced today is to have prospective application
only.
ExxonMobil, % 23 (emphasis added).
The Commission also asserts that the additional claims should not be permitted
because the ExxonMobil Court did not intend to create a "favored entity." Commission's
Brief, p. 18. This is not correct. A prospective effect limitation which permits retroactive
application of a "new rule" to certain named parties, by its very nature, creates a "favored
entity." Rio Algom Corp., 681 P.2d at 196 (retroactive effect given to six plaintifftaxpayers who were parties to the appeal); V-l Oil Co., 942 P.2d at 914 (decision only
retroactive for V-l).
The Court has deemed the creation of the "favored entity" to be essential because
prospective application of the "new rule" to litigants "would have the potential of
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discouraging other litigants from challenging statutes of questionable validity." Id. This
Court has observed, "It would be unconscionable to deprive the litigant who has sustained
the burden of attacking an unconstitutional statute of the fruits of victory." Id. The
ExxonMobil Court recognized that ExxonMobil had "expended considerable time and
resources to attack the actions of the Tax Commission" and refused to "deprive
ExxonMobil of the fruits of victory." ExxonMobil, 1f 23. The Commission has entirely
disregarded those concerns and has forced ExxonMobil to expend considerable additional
time and resources to obtain the relief to which it believes it is expressly entitled under
the ExxonMobil decision.
The Commission also suggests that the prospective effect limitation should be
interpreted to exclude the refund claims by ExxonMobil and MEPNA because, it
contends, the Court was not aware of those potential claims in 2003. Order, p. 10
(R. 382)("[ExxonMobiPs] interpretation greatly extends the Court's limited retroactive
application to refund requests unknown to the Court at the time of the decision");
Commission's Brief, p. 18 ("the scope of the claims, the years at issue, and the amounts at
issue are all well beyond the scope of the [ExxonMobil] claim."). Ironically the
Commission has upheld the Division's post-ExxonMobil deficiency assessments which
were based on the misinterpretation of applicable law even though those assessments
were unknown to the Court at the time of the decision. See, e.g. Union Oil Co. v. Utah
State Tax Comm'n, Case No. 20080068-SC (appeal of Commission's decision upholding
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post-ExxonMobil deficiency assessments). The Commission's willingness to enforce
unanticipated post-ExxonMobil deficiency assessments based on rejected statutory
interpretations of severance tax law simply cannot be reconciled with its claim that the
refund requests, which are based on the correct interpretation of severance tax law, are
barred because they were "unknown to the [ExxonMobil] Court." The fact that the Court
did not discuss or anticipate specific claims which were eventually asserted by
ExxonMobil in a timely manner does not mean that those claims are barred.
By its own admission, the Commission "interpreted] the Court's retroactive
application narrowly to only include the 'refund request' before the Court in
ExxonMobil." Order, p. 10 (R. 518). That Court specifically declared that the "as to all
but ExxonMobil the rule announced today is to have prospective application." The
Commission did not have the authority to narrow the scope of this Court's order and
deprive ExxonMobil of the retroactive application of ExxonMobil
D.

The Commission Has Inadequately Responded to ExxonMobil's Claim
That it Erred When it Interpreted the Prospective Relief Limitation
Narrowly to Further Flawed Policy Considerations.

ExxonMobil devoted seven pages of its brief to a discussion of why the
Commission erred when it held that the ExxonMobil Court's "policy considerations
[were] best met by interpreting the Court's retroactive application narrowly to include
only the 'refund request' before the court in ExxonMobil Corporation." Order, p. 10
(R. 383). See Opening Brief, pp. 23-30. In that section of the Brief, ExxonMobil
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explained that the ExxonMobil Court had already weighed the interests of the litigant
against its fiscal concerns and concluded that ExxonMobil was entitled to retroactive
application of the decision. ExxonMobil explained that the Commission erred when it
narrowly interpreted of the scope of the prospective relief limitation "to broadly protect
the small government entities from other refund requests not before it," Order, p. 10
(R. 383), inasmuch as, in so doing, the Commission was giving greater weight to the
Court's fiscal concerns than the Court itself had given. The Commission has not
responded to ExxonMobil's claim that the Commission's decision to narrow the
prospective relief limitation is an impermissible re-weighing of the interests of the parties
to ExxonMobil and effectively deprives ExxonMobil of the "fruits of victory" to which
this Court had determined ExxonMobil was entitled. ExxonMobil, \ 23.
ExxonMobil also explained that the Commission's decision to narrowly interpret
the prospective relief limitation ignored the long-standing policy of interpreting
applicable law in favor of the taxpayer. The Commission did not respond to
ExxonMobil's claim that the Commission's willingness to infer unarticulated limitations
impermissibly limited the scope of relief available to ExxonMobil.
Finally, ExxonMobil detailed the knowledge the Commission had of factual errors
which formed the basis of the ExxonMobil Court's decision to adopt the prospective relief
limitation. The Commission has not denied that it was fiilly aware of these factual errors
at the time it issued the Order, nor has it explained why it narrowly interpreted the
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prospective relief limitation to further policy considerations which the Commission knew
were based on mistakes of fact.3
Prior to the Commission's decision in this matter, ExxonMobil demonstrated that
the ExxonMobil Court's concern for Amici Funds was misplaced inasmuch as the only
evidence provided to this Court proves that severance tax refunds are issued from the
State's General Fund and the Amici Funds are not affected. Opening Brief, p. 29. It also
demonstrated that there were no other "small governmental entities" implicated by the
severance tax refund actions. Id. at 28.4 In addition, ExxonMobil established that
severance taxes are only remitted to Amici Funds when the wells are located on Indian
lands. Yet the prospective relief limitation has been applied to all wells, regardless of
where they are located. Id.
Just as the Commission failed to respond to Unocal's explanation that the
ExxonMobil Court's policy considerations were based on erroneous assumptions, the
Commission continues to ignore and fails to rebut evidence that the ExxonMobil Court's
policy concerns were unfounded. It has not explained why it narrowly interpreted the
3

The Amici Funds have denied ExxonMobil's claims that the prospective relief
limitation was based on factual errors. However, those denials relate to ExxonMobil's
request that this Court reverse the prospective relief limitation, and are discussed below at
II.C. The discussion in this section specifically addresses the Commission's failure to
respond to ExxonMobil's claims that it narrowed the prospective relief limitation to
further policy considerations which it knew were based on factual errors.
4

The Amici Funds contend that the Oil and Gas Conservation Account will be
depleted by refunds, but that account consists of conservation fees, refunds of which were
not sought in the ExxonMobil appeal.
13

prospective relieve limitation to further policy considerations which it knew to be flawed.
The Commission's bald assertion that its interpretation "is consistent with the Court's
prior application of the doctrine of selective prospectivity and the Court's stated
rationalization for its application" is non-responsive and insufficient to justify the
Commission's narrowing of the prospective relief limitation. Commission's Brief, p. 19.
II.

THIS COURT SHOULD CORRECT ITS REFUSAL TO GIVE FULL
RETROACTIVE EFFECT TO THE EXXONMOBIL DECISION.
If the Court affirms the Commission's decision to narrowly interpret the

ExxonMobil prospective relief limitation to deny ExxonMobil retroactive application of
that decision, then ExxonMobil has requested that this Court reverse its decision to give
only prospective effect to the ExxonMobil decision. In Van Dyke v. Chappell, 818 P.2d
1032, 1025 (Utah 1991), this Court reversed a prospective relief limitation, stating "we
now recognize that in so stating the law, we did not examine carefully the basis for that
decision." This precedent clearly establishes that this Court may reverse the prospective
relief limitation if it concludes that it did not carefully examine the basis for limiting the
application of its decision.
A.

ExxonMobil Does Not Bear a "Substantial Burden of Persuasion" in
Requesting Reversal of the Prospective Relief Limitation.

The Commission claims that ExxonMobil faces a "substantial burden of
persuasion" in asking this Court to reverse the prospective relief limitation.
Commission's Brief, p. 24, quoting State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994). The
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Commission's characterization of the standard is incorrect and ignores the clarification
offered by the Menzies Court. After stating that "[t]hose asking us to overturn prior
precedent have a substantial burden of persuasion," the Menzies Court explained that
"[t]his burden is mandated by the doctrine of stare decisis." Id. The Court then explained
that stare decisis "does not require that a panel adhere to its own . . . prior decisions with
the same inflexibility as does vertical stare decisis." Id, p. 399, n. 3. Thus, the Court
held that "a panel may overrule its own or another panel's decision where 'the decision is
clearly erroneous or conditions have changed so as to render the prior decision
inapplicable.'"Id, quoting State v. Dungan, 149 Ariz. 357, 718 P.2d 1010, 1014 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1986); accord Munson v. Chamberlain, 2007 UT 91.
The one time this Court reversed its imposition of a prospective relief limitation, it
did so based simply on a finding that "it did not examine carefully the basis for that
decision." Van Dyke, 818 P.2dat 1025. The Van Dyke Court explained that, in Stoker v.
Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417 (Utah 1990), the Court had overruled a boundary-byacquiescence test which had been established several years earlier in Halladay v. Cluff,
685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984). The Court applied the Halliday standard to the facts in Judd
Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hutchings, 797 P.2d 1088 (Utah 1990), because the trial had
occurred prior to the reversal in Stoker. By so doing, the Van Dyke Court explained that,
"[i]n effect, we said that the Stoker decision should be applied prospectively only." 818
P.2d at 1025. In its examination of that prospective effect limitation, the Van Dyke Court
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acknowledged that the imposition of a prospective relief limitation required a change in
the law, "justifiable reliance on the prior state of the law/5 and a showing of "whether
some other undue burden would result from retroactive application of [the new law]." Id.
Although there had been a change in the law, the Court held that there could not be
justifiable reliance on a requirement which existed for fewer than ten years. It also
rejected the argument that the change in law created an "undue burden" by "increasing]
the burden of defending" against a boundary-by-acquiescence claim. Id. at 1025-1026.
The Court held that "[i]f such an approach were followed, any decision that modified in
any way a previously articulated legal standard would have to be prospective only,
making prospective application the rule rather than the exception." Id. at 1026.
Concluding that the Court had "not examine[d] carefully the basis for that decision," it
did not hesitate to reverse the prospective effect limitation. Id. at 1025.
This is the same standard articulated by the Court in Munson v. Chamberlain.
However, the Commission claims that Munson does not apply because "the parties and
several amici presented adversarial briefs on the issue of retroactivity and prospectivity at
both the initial stage and on rehearing." Commission's Brief, p. 26. The emergence of
this issue in the late stages of the appeals process is a far cry from the circumstances
favored by the Munson Court, to wit, "actual[] litigat[ion of the issues] in the lower
courts." Id. (emphasis added). The Commission claims that the filing of a motion for
rehearing by amici oil and gas producers (and not ExxonMobil) demonstrates the
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adequacy of this Court's consideration of the prospective relief issue. Munson supports
reversal of the prospective relief limitation because (1) the issue was never "litigated in
the lower courts," id.; (2) ExxonMobil was not a participant in the motion for
reconsideration; (3) there was never a hearing on that motion; and (4) there is no evidence
that the denial of the motion was based on the merits, particularly inasmuch as the
Commission's opposition to the motion was based entirely on its claim that the amici
parties did not have standing to make such a motion.
The ExxonMobil Court's failure to carefully examine the basis for its decision
denying retroactive relief is illustrated by the Court's imposition of the limitation even
though the ExxonMobil decision did not create new law; the undue weight given to the
concerns expressed by Amici Funds which had no support in the record before the
ExxonMobil Court and are disproved by the record in this appeal; and the concerns
articulated by ExxonMobil if this precedent is not reversed which concerns have not been
disputed by the Commission or the Amici Funds. If the Court does not reverse the
prospective relief limitation, then, when the Court reverses an agency's persistent
misinterpretation of statutory provisions, prospective application may become "the rule
rather than the exception." Van Dyke, 818 P.2d at 1026.
B.

Under Well-Established Utah Law, a Prospective Relief Limitation Is
Only Appropriate When a Decision Establishes New Law,

In its Opening Brief, ExxonMobil explained that the threshold requirement which
must be met before the Court can impose a prospective relief limitation is that the
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decision must have established "new law." Chevron Oil v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
The Amici Funds agree that prospective effect limitations can only been imposed in
"decisions invalidating or changing the interpretation of a statute." Amici Funds' Brief,
p. 7. In its Response Brief, the Commission admitted that the ExxonMobil Court "merely
interpreted a statute and did not establish 'new law."' Commission's Brief, pp. 23-24
(emphasis added). Inasmuch as the ExxonMobil Court did not invalidate or change the
interpretation of a statute, it did not establish "new law." Therefore, if this Court follows
established precedent requiring the establishment of "new law" before a prospective relief
limitation can be imposed, then it should reverse the prospective relief limitation in the
ExxonMobil case.
The Commission was apparently comfortable conceding that ExxonMobil "did not
establish 'new law'" because it believes that the Chevron Oil standard is not utilized by
this Court; and that this Court has imposed a prospective relief limitation in other cases
prior to ExxonMobil where the Court's decision did not result in new law. The
Commission's attempt to characterize this Court's decisions imposing prospective relief
limitations as not adhering to the "new law" requirement of Chevron Oil appears to be
based on the Commission's erroneous claim that "Chevron was not cited or analyzed by
the Court in any of the cases decided subsequent to

Andrews...."

This Court's adherence to the Chevron Oil standard was clearly demonstrated in
Kennecott, wherein this Court stated that it "reached the same conclusion" as the
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Colorado Supreme Court, and quoted the Colorado court's statement that, in matters of
state law, "'we continue to adhere to the Chevron . . . analysis in resolving the issue of
retroactive or prospective application of the state judicial decision.'" Kennecott, 862 P.2d
at 1352, n. 23, quoting Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 112 n. 7 (Colo.
1992). Regardless of whether the Court cited Chevron Oil in each of its decisions, until
ExxonMobil, the Court has consistently followed the Chevron Oil test when it has given
its decision prospective effect.
In every case cited by ExxonMobil, the Commission, and the Amici Funds, where
this Court imposed a prospective relief limitation, it did so because "new law" was
created by its decision. In most cases, new law was created when the Court held a statute
unconstitutional. V-l Oil, 942 P.2d 906 (statute held unconstitutional); Timpanogos
Planning and Water Management v. Central Utah Water Conservancy District, Utah, 690
P.2d 562 (1984)(statute allowing district court to appoint board of directors of water
conservancy districts held unconstitutional); RioAlgom Corp., 681 P.2d 184 (taxing
statute held unconstitutional). In the other cited cases, new law was created when wellestablished precedent was overturned, Loyal Order of Moose # 259 v. County Bd. of
Equalization, 657 P.2d 257, 265 (Utah 1982)(Court gave prospective effect to its
correction of "an interpretation of law that has been relied on [since 1911]."), or when the
Court created law because there was not a law in effect with respect to the issue before
the Court. Board of Education v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030, 1036 (Utah
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1983)("Utah statutes do not address the subject of interest on school funds"). ExxonMobil
is the sole exception to this practice.5
The Commission's claim that "prospective application of a rule is not restricted to
instances where 'new law' is established" is based entirely on its interpretation of Board
of Education v. Salt Lake County. Brief of Respondent, p. 23. However, the
Commission's reliance on that case is misplaced. The Board of Education of the Granite
School District sued the county and its treasurer for damages based on the treasurer's
failure to timely remit to Granite its share of property taxes. The Court held that the
treasurer had failed to comply with mandatory statutory provisions regarding disbursal of
funds to Granite. It also observed that the treasurer's "practice of delaying payment of
taxes to the various entities is one of long-standing," and that "no one has heretofore
challenged that practice in the courts." Board of Education, 659 P.2d at 1037. The Board
sought damages in the form of interest, but the Court found that "Utah statutes do not

5

In its Opening Brief, ExxonMobil also cited to several decisions from other
jurisdictions wherein the courts refused to limit the retroactive application of its decision
because the decisions were matters of statutory interpretation and, thus, "did not establish
a new principle of law." Broyles v. Ft Lyon Canal Co., 695 P.2d 1136, 1144 (Colo.
1985); Clark v. State Farm Mut Auto Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1234, 1242 (10th Cir.
2003)(decision "involving] the interpretation of a statute . . . did not establish a new
principle of law . . . [and] must be applied retroactively"); Sodexho Marriott Mgmt. v.
United States, 61 Fed. CI. 229, 238 (Fed. CI. 2004)(decision interpreting statute did not
establish new principle of law and should be given full retroactive effect). Rather than
present competing case law, the Commission simply alleges that "federal precedent is not
binding." However, these cases demonstrate that a decision which merely interprets a
statute, as the Commission admits occurred in the ExxonMobil case, should be given full
retroactive effect.
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address the subject of interest on school funds." Id. at 1036. Therefore it relied on a
"well established rule allowing interest on overdue debts" to conclude, for the first time,
that a governmental entity would be liable for damages when it delayed remitting property
taxes to various entities. Clearly this case involved the establishment of new law
inasmuch as this practice had never been challenged and Utah statutes did not address the
damage issue.
This Court has long recognized that, in matters of statutory interpretation, "the
ruling of a court is deemed to state the true nature of the law both retrospectively and
prospectively." Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 675 (Utah 1984). The Commission
concedes that the ExxonMobil Court "merely interpreted a statute and did not establish
'new law/" Commission's Brief, pp. 23-24 (emphasis added). The Amici Funds agree
that prospective effect limitations are only appropriate when "new law" is created. Amici
Funds' Brief, pp. 7-10. Because the interpretation of a statute did not establish "new
law," the ExxonMobil Court should have given full retroactive effect to its interpretation
of the severance tax statutes.
C.

The ExxonMobil Court's Failure to Carefully Examine the Basis for its
Prospective Relief Limitation Is Demonstrated by the Undue Weight
Given to the Alleged Burden on "Amici Revitalization Funds and Other
Small Governmental Entities."

When a Court establishes "new law," it may give prospective effect to its decision
when it concludes that there has been "justifiable reliance on the prior state of the law,"
and that an "undue burden would result from retroactive application of [the new law]."
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Van Dyke, 818 P.2d at 1025.6 Because this analysis is only relevant "when a judicial
decision decisively changes the common law," this Court need not reach this issue if it
concludes that ExxonMobil did not establish new law. Id.
The ExxonMobil Court did not suggest that there had been "justifiable reliance on
the prior state of the law." Indeed, "justifiable reliance" was an impossibility because the
Commission could not "justifiably" rely on what this Court concluded was a
misinterpretation of severance tax provisions. Furthermore, the Commission has not
disputed the fact that all available precedent supported ExxonMobil's interpretation of
severance tax provisions. See Opening Brief, p. 36. Finally, inasmuch as the
Commission has admitted that the "Court merely interpreted a statute and did not
establish 'new law,5" the Commission cannot claim to have relied on a "prior state of the
law."
Because justifiable reliance was not asserted and is an impossibility, the only basis
on which the Court based its imposition of the prospective relief limitation was its
concern "that retroactive application could result in large refunds of taxes already
collected and spent by governmental entities." ExxonMobil, ^f 23. ExxonMobil has

6

The Commission misstates the standard as examining "the extent of reliance on
previous state law and the burden that would be imposed by retroactive application."
Commission's Brief, p. 22. Although the Commission cites Van Dyke in support of that
characterization, the Van Dyke Court clearly acknowledged the threshold requirement that
new law be created, as well as the need for "justifiable reliance" and the showing of an
"undue burden" resulting from the retroactive application of the new law. 818 P.2d at
1025.
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explained that the facts in the record conclusively demonstrate that the Court's concern
for the Amici Funds was misplaced because (1) there is no evidence that the Amici Funds
are impacted by refund requests; (2) other "small governmental entities" are not
implicated by refund requests; (3) the Amici Funds are not impacted by severance tax
from wells which are not located on Indian lands; and (4) the Amici Funds have no legal
right to a revenue windfall resulting from post-ExxonMobil deficiency assessments which
enforce the Commission's misinterpretation of severance tax laws. Opening Brief, pp.
43-45.
The Commission's response to the evidence that the ExxonMobil Court gave
inordinate weight to alleged potential impact on the Amici Funds was confined to the
following four statements:
1.

"[T]he judicial policy of the Court to apply a decision prospectively only
depends on burdens that may be disruptive and does not require the Court to
show that there will be an actual burden." Commission's Brief, p. 24.

2.

"[NJothing in the record indicates that the selective prospectivity applied in
this case is not functioning precisely as the Court intended." Id., p. 25

3.

"[T]he Court clearly supported its decision by citing to prior case law and
by enunciating the judicial policy it sought to achieve by applying selective
prospectivity." Id., p. 26.

4.

"The Petitioners' bare assertions-that amici and State government would
not be burdened if full retroactivity were applied is belied by the number
and dollar amounts of the claims it brings in this appeal.

These statements do not adequately refiite the evidence provided by ExxonMobil that the
Court gave undue weight to concerns expressed by the Amici Funds.
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The Commission's minimizing of the standard as only requiring a showing that
burdens "may be disruptive" is clearly at odds with the standard applied by this Court in
prior cases. See Rio Algom, 681 P.2d at 195 (State decisions imposing prospective
limitations "rely on . . . the great financial and administrative hardship that would be
entailed if general retroactive effect were allowed."). By suggesting that judicial policy
"does not require the Court to show that there will be an actual burden," the Commission
attempts to bar the door to post-ExxonMobil evidence which demonstrates that the
Court's assumptions were wrong. Such evidence is crucial to a Court's ability to
determine whether a rule ought to continue in force:
The general American doctrine as applied to courts of last resort is that a
court is not inexorably bound by its own precedents but will follow the rule
of law which it has established in earlier cases, unless clearly convinced
that the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of
changing conditions and that more good than harm will come by departing
from precedent.
Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399, quoting John Hanna, The Role of Precedent in Judicial
Decision, 2 Vill. L. Rev. 367, 367 (1957).
The Commission's allegation that the selective prospectivity is functioning as
intended is meaningless. Certainly the prospective effect limitation has successfully
prevented taxpayers from challenging deficiency assessments and pursuing refund claims.
That does not mean that the Court was correct in imposing that limitation.
The Commission's statement that the Court "enunciated] the judicial policy it
sought to achieve" is likewise unavailing. The mere enunciation of judicial policy does
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not imbue it with validity. Francis v. Southern Pac. R.R., 333 U.S. 445, 471
(1948)(Black, J., dissenting)("When precedent and precedent alone is all the argument
that can be made to support a court-fashioned rule, it is time for the rule's creator to
destroy it."), quoted in State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399. ExxonMobil has demonstrated
that the enunciated judicial policy was based on misrepresentations and unfounded
assumptions and the Commission has provided no rebuttal.
Finally, the Commission claims that the necessity of the prospective effect
limitation is demonstrated "by the number and dollar amounts of the claims
[ExxonMobil] brings in this appeal." The refund requests by ExxonMobil, excluding
interest, total just over $1.6 million. It is essential to keep in mind that ExxonMobil is
entitled to these refunds under the correct interpretation of severance tax laws. The
only reason ExxonMobil has been denied these additional refunds is because the
Commission has refused to apply the ExxonMobil decision retroactively. ExxonMobil's
entitlement to relief is not dependent on the amount of the refund. Furthermore, all
available evidence establishes that any refund to ExxonMobil will be issued out of the
State's General Fund. A refund in the amount requested by ExxonMobil is a minuscule
fraction of the General Fund.7

7

The revenues deposited into the General Fund in fiscal year 2008 were
approximately $1,995 billion dollars. Utah State Tax Commission Annual Report 2008
Fiscal Year, p. 12. Thus, the requested refund of $1.6 million dollars would constitute
about .000802 of the fund.
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If the Commission truly believes that the validity of the prospective relief
limitation can be established by the number and dollar amount of refund requests, then
evidence of the number and dollar amount of deficiency assessments issued against
taxpayers which have paid their severance taxes in accordance with the law as determined
by the ExxonMobil Court would conclusively establish the error in the Court's decision.
Those deficiency assessments issued to taxpayers who correctly paid their severance
taxes and whose wells are not on Indian lands total more than $4 million. See n. 9,

infra.
D.

The Amici Funds Have Not Demonstrated the Validity of the
ExxonMobil Court's Concerns for the Potential Burden Resulting
from Retroactive Application of the Court's Decision,

Once again, it is important to note, that the alleged burden on the Amici Funds is
only relevant if this Court concludes that the ExxonMobil decision established new law.
According to the Amici Funds, the concerns articulated by the ExxonMobil Court were
valid and any facts subsequent to the Court's decision are not relevant in determining
whether the Court's assumptions were correct. In Munson, this Court held that it is
appropriate to consider such facts because a prior decision should be overruled'" when
conditions have changed so as to render the prior decision wholly inapplicable.'" 2007
UT 91 If 21, quoting State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399 n. 3. According to the Amici
Funds, reversal of the prospective relief limitation will "(1) provide an unexpected
windfall for oil and gas producers; (2) result in a very troublesome revenue drain to the
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State at a time of strained budgets and finances; and (3) create an impossible situation for
the Amici, since severance tax revenue distributed to them has been expended and is not
available to be refunded." Amici Funds' Brief, p. 10.
ExxonMobil believes that this Court's review of the proceedings before the
Commission should be "'limited to the evidence contained in the record on appeal.'"
State of Utah v. Pliego, 1999 UT 8, 974 P.2d 279, quoting Wilderness Bldg. Sys., Inc. v.
Chapman, 699 P.2d 766, 768 (Utah 1985). Well-established facts demonstrate that the
concerns raised by the Amici Funds are either erroneous or insufficient to justify
continued enforcement of the prospective effect limitation.
1.

Reversal of the prospective effect limitation would not provide a
"windfall to oil and gas producers," but would return tax monies
to the taxpayers to which they are legally entitled.

The Amici Funds claim that reversal of the prospective effect limitation will
"provide an unexpected windfall for oil and gas producers." Id., p. 10.8 The Amici
Fund's characterization of a legitimate refund as a "windfall" ignores the fact that this
Court concluded that valuation of the oil and gas should have occurred "in the immediate
vicinity of the well, with the oil and gas remaining in a relatively natural state."
ExxonMobil, % 24. The Commission's persistent misinterpretation of severance tax
8

The Amici Funds claim that, under James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia,
501 U.S. 529 (1991), a court may decline to give retroactive effect to its decision when
"persons other than the litigants might receive a windfall." Amici Funds' Brief, p. 8.
This was not a consideration discussed in the Beam decision. Retroactivity presumes that
the parties to whom a decision may retroactively apply are entitled to the relief afforded
by retroactive application of that decision.
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provisions resulted in a substantial windfall to the state coffers and to the Amici Funds.
ExxonMobil is simply trying to obtain a refund of taxes it should never have been
required to pay. To suggest that the refund of illegally collected taxes would result in a
"windfall" to the taxpayer assumes that the taxpayer is not entitled to the money it seeks
and blatantly mischaracterizes the potential outcome of this case. Tucson Elec. Power
Co. v. Apache Co., 185 Ariz. 5, 20, 912 P.2d 9, 24 (Ariz. App. 1995)("[W]e find it
difficult to conceive how requiring the state and the affected counties to refund the
proceeds of an illegal tax to those who paid it under protest could be viewed as
'substantially inequitable.5").
2.

The alleged potential drain on state resources is overstated and
provides no basis to uphold the prospective relief limitation if
this Court concludes it erred.

The Amici Funds claim that the prospective relief limitation was appropriate
because retroactive application had "the potential of opening the door to refund claims by
dozens of oil and gas producers." Amici Funds' Brief, p. 11. The Amici Funds claim
that the threat of multiple claims remains because "[t]here were and are many other
potential refund claimants, large and small, waiting in the wings." Amici Funds' Brief, p.
12. The Amici Funds have not provided any evidence that such a threat exits. According
to the record before this Court, ExxonMobil is the only pending refund case. There are
three other severance tax cases, but those are challenges to deficiency assessments by
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operators whose wells are not on Indian lands.9 Thus there would be no impact on the
Amici Funds.
In the legislative session immediately following the issuance of the ExxonMobil
decision, the Legislature amended the severance tax statutes to specifically require that
transportation costs be deducted from the value of oil and gas at the well. Consequently,
there are no refund claims for taxes collected after January 1, 2004. Because there is a
six-year statute of limitations on severance tax matters, any potential refund claims for
years earlier than 2003 are now barred. Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-114(2)(a). The only
potential refund claims that could be requested at this time regarding the subject issue
would be for the overpayment of severance taxes in 2003. There is simply no evidence in
the record that there are any other entities who are seeking a refund claim on this issue for

9

This Court may take judicial notice of the deficiency assessment cases pending
before it and other state courts and agencies. Deficiency assessments against Union Oil
Company of California ("Unocal") issued prior to ExxonMobil total $1,394,166.19, plus
interest. Union Oil Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm % Case No. 20080068-SC, Opening
Brief, Addendum p. 0015 ^f 72. The deficiency assessments issued against Unocal after
the ExxonMobil decision total $795,311.99, plus interest. Id., Addendum pp. 0017-0018
•J 87. See Addendum 1 attached hereto. Deficiency assessments against River Gas
Corporation for tax years 1994-98 total approximately $376,583.56, plus interest. River
Gas Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm % Case No. 060700437 (2nd Dist. Ct). See
Addendum 2 attached hereto. Deficiency assessments issued after ExxonMobil against
the same River Gas wells (now titled in the name of ConocoPhillips) for tax years 19992003 total approximately $1,518,557.80, plus interest. ConocoPhillips v. Auditing
Division of the Utah State Tax Comm 9n, Tax Comm'n Appeal No. 04-0316. See
Addendum 3 attached hereto. None of the wells involved in these deficiency cases are
located on Indian lands.
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the 2003 tax year. However, even if such claims exist, that fact would not outweigh the
rights of taxpayers to obtain refunds of their severance tax overpayments.
The Amici's argument also ignores the fact that many of the "potential claimants"
to which it refers have challenged deficiency assessments. Because this Court held that
ExxonMobil could not be applied to deficiency proceedings before the Commission, the
Division began issuing deficiency assessments against taxpayers which had correctly
calculated their severance tax liability.10 By issuing deficiency assessment, the Division
has attempted to collect millions of dollars in severance tax payments based on a statutory
interpretation which was rejected by this Court. The Amici Funds warn that allowing
such challenges to proceed will "chang[e] the settled expectations of all parties." Amici
Funds' Brief, p. 12. They also warn that "[a]ny reduction in severance tax collections . . .
would cause havoc." Id. The State and the Amici Funds do not have a legitimate
expectation in deficiency assessments which are based on a statutory interpretation which
has been rejected by this Court. The Division's issuance of such assessments against
severance taxpayers which had paid their severance taxes under the correct interpretation
of the law was likely not anticipated by the ExxonMobil Court. If the Court does not
reverse the prospective relief limitation, then the State's General Fund and the Amici
Funds will receive a windfall at taxpayer expense.
10

In its appeal, Unocal argued that the prospective relief limitation only applied to
"deficiency proceedings [which were] pending before the Tax Commission" when the
ExxonMobil decision was issued. ExxonMobil, H 24. This Court has not yet ruled on the
Unocal appeal.
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3.

All available evidence suggests that the ExxonMobil Court's
concern for the financial impact on the Amici Funds was
unfounded.

In their 2003 amicus brief, the Amici Funds alleged that they would be irreparably
harmed if the Court's interpretation of severance tax law required them to issue severance
tax refunds. The Court acknowledged that "the foil breadth and depth of the impact is not
immediately apparent from the record," but assumed, based on representations made by
the Amici Funds, that refunds "would pose a great burden on the amici revitalization
funds and other relatively small governmental entities." ExxonMobil, ^ 23.11 Facts
subsequent to that decision are essential to demonstrate that the Court's unprecedented
decision to deny the retroactive application of its statutory interpretation was based on a
critical erroneous assumption-that the Amici Funds would be required to issue "[l]arge
refunds of money already collected and spent." Id.
In reality, the Amici Funds were not affected by the refund permitted in that case
because the refund was issued out of the State's General Fund. Opening Brief, p. 44.
Neither the Commission nor the Amici Funds have denied this fact. Evidence produced
11

The Amici Funds suggest that the "other small governmental entities" referred
to by the ExxonMobil Court included the Division of Oil, Gas & Mining, which receives
funding from conservation fees which are calculated based on severance taxes. These
fees were not at issue in either ExxonMobil or Unocal Under Utah Code section 40-614.5(6), those fees are deposited into a restricted account. Once the account reaches
$750,000, the excess funds are deposited in the State's General Fund. There has never
been any evidence before this Court to suggest that the Division of Oil, Gas & Mining
would be negatively impacted by retroactive application of ExxonMobil The alleged,
unsubstantiated threat to that division does not outweigh the taxpayer's right to retain its
own money and not be illegally and excessively taxed.
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by the Auditing Division and attached in the addendum to Petitioner's Opening Brief in
Union Oil Co. of California v. Utah State Tax Comm% Case No. 20080068-SC,
contained the Division's admission that the refunds to ExxonMobil were issued from the
State's General Fund and that the State did not seek reimbursement from the Amici Funds
for those refunds. See reference to that evidence at Opening Brief, Addendum 4, p. 33,
n. 4 (evidence referenced in that footnote attached hereto as Addendum 4).
In all of the proceedings before this Court, neither the Commission nor the Amici
Funds have presented any evidence that the State's General Fund is legally authorized to
ask the Amici Funds to return any severance tax monies previously appropriated to the
Amici Funds. Inasmuch as all evidence of record suggests that a refund to ExxonMobil
would be generated from the State's General Fund, the Amici Funds' claim that they will
be financially devastated if the prospective effect limitation is reversed should be
disregarded. Pliego, 1999 UT at % 7, 974 P.2d at 280, (court's review is '"limited to the
evidence contained in the record on appeal.'").
The Amici Funds also allege that the revitalization funds were established with an
expectation of a certain level of funding based on the statutory formula. Amici Funds'
Brief, pp. 5-6. According to the Amici Funds, the reduction in revenue resulting from the
ExxonMobil Court's interpretation of severance tax provisions had (and continues to
have) the potential to cause 'the Indian people [to] consider[] this as another example of
having been given promises which were not fulfilled"; cause the Utes to "implement their
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proposed, economically damaging Business Activity Fee"; and result in "[t]he Navajos
taking the position that they are no longer bound by negotiated concessions that they
made." Amici Funds9 Brief, p. 6. These allegations provide no basis for the Court to
uphold the prospective relief limitation. Those "expectations," if they existed, would
have been based on a misinterpretation of law. Furthermore, there is no threat that the
concerns expressed by the Amici Funds will "be realized in the future should the revenues
derived by the Amici Funds be insufficient" because the ExxonMobil Court's
interpretation of the severance tax laws is the interpretation which has been in effect since
the decision was issued.
The ExxonMobil decision did not change that statutory formula, but simply
provided the correct interpretation of the statute. Malan, 693 P.2d at 676. Thus any
expectation by the Amici Funds that the beneficiaries of the funds would receive
severance tax amounts in excess of what the law allowed does not provide a legitimate
basis for this Court to refuse retroactive application of the ExxonMobil decision.
E.

Imposing a Prospective Relief Limitation When New Law Has Not
Been Created Usurps Legislative Authority and Leads to Agency
Abuse,

Because the ExxonMobil Court imposed a prospective relief limitation in a matter
of statutory interpretation, precedent has been established with potentially far-reaching
ramifications which neither the Commission nor the Amici Funds acknowledge or
address.
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This Court has always refused to defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute.
Bennion v. Graham Resources, 849 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah 1993)("[W]e review the Board's
interpretation of the applicable statutes for correctness and give its view on the matter no
particular deference.55). Yet, because this Court refused to give retroactive effect to its
correction of the agency's misinterpretation of severance tax laws, an agency has been
empowered to enforce its misinterpretation of severance tax laws, despite this Court's
unambiguous declaration that "[vjaluation must occur in the immediate vicinity of the
well, with the oil and gas remaining in a relatively natural state." ExxonMobil, f 24.
Subsequent to the ExxonMobil decision, the Division issued deficiency
assessments totaling millions of dollars against taxpayers who had paid their severance
taxes based on value of the oil and gas "in the immediate vicinity of the well." Id.
However, because this Court refused to give retroactive effect to its decision, the Division
concluded that it could issue those assessments for time periods preceding the decision
and that the taxpayer would be powerless to defend against the assessments. Indeed, the
Commission has enforced the assessments based on this Court's refusal to give
retroactive effect to the ExxonMobil decision.
If the Court upholds the prospective relief limitation, then, as ExxonMobil warned
in its Opening Brief, taxing entities will have virtual immunity in refund actions and
deficiency proceedings. A taxing entity could interpret taxing provisions in a manner
which allows it to collect taxes to which it is not legally entitled. Until a judicial
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interpretation of the misapplied taxing provision is rendered, the taxing entity could
continue to enforce its misinterpretation. The longer the taxing entity has persisted in its
misapplication of the statute, the greater its alleged financial interest will be. Under
ExxonMobil, that financial interest would provide an adequate basis for imposing a
prospective relief limitation which deprives all taxpayers, except the first one to the
courthouse, of relief to which they would otherwise be entitled under Utah law. As this
Court so eloquently stated in Van Dyke, such an approach would make "prospective
application the rule rather than the exception." Id. at 1026.
CONCLUSION
ExxonMobil respectfully requests this Court to interpret the ExxonMobil decision
in accordance with its plain language and direct the Commission to issue the refunds
requested by Petitioners. Alternatively, ExxonMobil requests this Court to recognize that
it "did not examine carefully" the basis for the prospective relief limitation and conclude
that the ExxonMobil Court's prospective effect limitation was erroneous. Van Dyke, 818
P.2d 1025.
DATED this 23rd day of September, 2009.
WOOD CRAPO LLC

David J. Crapo
Attorneys for Petitioner
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BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND FINAL DECISION
UNION OIL COMPANY OF
CALIFORNIA,
Petitioner,

Appeal No.
01-0033
Tax Type:
Severance Tax
Audit Period: 1994, 1995, 1996 & 1997

!

Appeal No.
04-1283
Tax Type:
Conservation Fee
Audit Period: 1998 & 1999

v.
AUDITING DIVISION
OF THE UTAH STATE
TAX COMMISSION,

Appeal No.
04-1284
Tax Type:
Severance Tax
Audit Period: 1998 & 1999

Respondent.
!

Presiding:

Judge:

Chapman

Pam Hendrickson, Commission Chair
R. Bruce Johnson, Commissioner
Marc B. Johnson, Commissioner
D'Arcy Dixon Pignanelli, Commissioner
Kerry R. Chapman, Administrative Law Judge

Appearances: For Petitioner:

For Respondent:

Mr. David J. Crapo, Attorney at Law
Ms. Renee Crosby
Mr. Russ Wimberley
Mr. Jason Thakker
Ms. Inge-Lise Goss, from Auditing Division
Mr. Clark L. Snelson, Assistant Attorney General
Mr. Laron Lind, Assistant Attorney General
Ms. Inge-Lise Goss, from Auditing Division
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This matter pertains to a consolidated appeal of three separate Statutory Notices issued to
Union Oil Company of California ("Unocal") by the Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax
Commission (the "Division"). On March 27, 28, and 29, 2007, the Tax Commission conducted a Formal
Hearing for the consolidated appeals. On May 14, 2007, each of the parties submitted a post-hearing
Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision.

OOUU-iO

Appeal Nos. 01-0033, 04-1283 & 04-1284

71.

On March 22, 2000, the Division sent a Preliminary Notice - Severance Tax to

Unocal containing an Audit Summary. In the "Explanation of Audit Findings" contained in the Audit
Summary,the Division stated that: 1) Unocal sold their oil production under arm's-length contracts at the
well or from the unit; 2) the gross value received under those arm's-length contracts is the appropriate
value for severance tax; and 3) residue gas and NGLs are sold at the plant tailgate.40
72.

On December 8, 2000, the Division issued a Statutory Notice - Severance Tax

for the period January 1, 1994 through December 31, 1997, in which it asserted a severance tax deficiency
in the total amount of $1,082,951.70, plus interest computed to January 7, 2001 in the amount of
$311,214.49, for a total deficiency of $1,394,166.19. In the explanation of audit findings, the Division
stated that "[information from Unocal's original and amended severance tax returns were used to
compute the tax liability for the audit period." 4l
73.

At the Formal Hearing, Ms. Goss testified that the Division had used contract

prices from sales of the oil and gas at the tailgate of the plant as the basis to value Unocal's oil and gas.
74.

Ms. Goss testified that the Division used the net-back method to calculate the

value of the NGLs, but only allowed a processing cost deduction of two-thirds (66 2/3%) of the value of
the NGLs. Ms. Goss claimed that this was the only deduction the Division allowed regarding Unocal's
processing costs at the Lisbon Plant.
75.

In its Statutory Notice, the Division reduced the combined taxable value of the

oil, gas, and NGLs by an annual exemption in the amount of $43,750.04 for tax year 1994, $43,750.00 for
tax year 1995, $42,205.85 for tax year 1996, and $39,494.31 for tax year 1997.42

Unocal's Exhibit 11.
Unocal's Exhibit 13.
Unocal's Exhibit 13, Schedule 1, pp. 1-3 & Schedule 4, p. L
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83.

There is no evidence that prior to issuing the May 3, 2004 Preliminary Notice,

the Division issued a letter or other notice informing Unocal that it would conduct an audit of Unocal in
regards to Utah's severance tax for the Second Audit Period.
84.

By letter dated June 8, 2004, Unocal informed the Division that it had filed

quarterly severance tax returns for 1998 and attached copies of those returns. Unocal also informed the
Division that it had ceased making additional severance tax payments beginning with the second quarter
of 1998 "due to the fact that [Unocal's] calculations showed no tax due when value is calculated on a net
back basis or that any amount due was offset by refunds due Unocal from the State."45
85.

The Division contends that on July 8, 2004, it issued Statutory Notices of

deficiency for severance taxes and conservation fees due for the period January 1, 1998 through
December 31, 1999, the Second Audit Period. The notices were mailed to Unocal's successor in the
Lisbon Unit, Tom Brown, Inc., the entity that purchased Unocal's interest in the Lisbon Unit effective
July 1, 1999. The assessments were not appealed within thirty days of their July 8, 2004 issuance date.
86.

On October 5, 2004, the Division reissued a Statutory Notice - Conservation Fee

to Unocal for the Second Audit Period, in the amount of $35,315.53, plus interest computed to November
4, 2004 in the amount of $12,394.19, for a total amount due of $47,709.72.46 Unocal appealed the
Statutory Notice within thirty days of October 5, 2004, and the appeal was docketed as Appeal No. 041283.
87.

Also on October 5, 2004, the Division reissued a Statutory Notice - Oil and Gas

Severance Tax to Unocal for the Second Audit Period, in the amount of $591,530.67 of additional tax,
plus interest computed to November 4, 2004 in the amount of $173,041.26. The Division also assessed a
10% penalty for failure to file a 1998 annual severance tax return, which totaled $30,740.06. The total
45
46

Unocal's Exhibit 15.
Unocal's Exhibit 14.
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severance tax deficiency assessed for the Second Audit Period was $795,311.99.47 Unocal appealed the
Statutory Notice within thirty days of October 5, 2004, and the appeal was docketed as Appeal No. 041284.
88.

In the Statutory Notices, the Division valued Unocal's gas and NGLs by relying

on its contract sales price for the products at the tailgate of the Lisbon Plant.48 The Division used the
contract sales prices as the starting point for valuing NGLs, but applied a 70% processing cost allowance
to the value of the NGLs, thereby employing a net-back method. The Division did not deduct processing
or transportation costs from the contract prices of the residue gas.
89.

The Division valued the oil by using posted prices for sweet oil at the Giant's

90.

The Commission finds that there is no dispute between the parties that the sour

Paradox Basin.

oil produced from the Mississippian Pool was not of like quality to the sweet oil produced by the Giant's
Paradox Basin until the sour oil had been processed at the Lisbon Plant.
91.

For tax year 1998, the Division reduced the combined taxable value of the oil,

gas, and NGLs by an annual exemption in the amount of $43,750.05.50
92.

For tax year 1999, the Division reduced the combined taxable value of the oil,

gas, and NGLs by an annual exemption in the amount of $21,875.03.51 According to the Division, the
available exemption was reduced by 50% because Unocal was the operator only through June 30, 1999;
i.e., one-half of the year.

47
48
49
50
51

Id.
Id, Schedules 2-4.
Id
Id, Schedule 2, p. 1.
Id, Schedule 3, p. 1.
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UTAH SEVERANCE TAX AUDIT SUMMARY
RIVER GAS CORPORATION
FOR THE PERIOD
01/01/1994-13/31/1998
Report Date: 8/25/2000
Account Number: N1600 & N1605
Field Name: Drunkard Wash
Field Number: 046
Examining Officer
Heidi Bullock

River Gas Corporation
511 Energy Center 8lvdNorthport,AL 35476

Exhibit A
Exhibit B
Total
*Note:

$134,110,74
$242,472.82
$376,583,56

Interest Computed To:
Daily Interest Amount:

$0.00
$0,00
$0.00

$38,444.50
$30,963.59
$69,408.09

$172,555.24
$273,436.41
$445,991.65

09/24/00
$72.22

The following summarizes the severance tax adjustments.

2. RGC also underreported product value. The company deducted separator repairs, compressor rentals, electric power compression,
and compression station expenses. These are not allowable deductions. Gas transportation costs were allowed.
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HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP
Mark K.Buchi #0475
Steven P. Young #7681
299 South Main Street, Suite #1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-5800
Attorneys for Plaintiff

THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

RIVER GAS CORPORATION,
Plaintiff,

PETITION FOR REVEEW BY TRIAL
DE NOVO OF UTAH STATE TAX
COMMISSION DECISION and
REQUEST FOR A TAX JUDGE

vs.
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Defendant.

Case No. f ^ f f l r t f t o ? .

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-1-601, 59-l-602(l)(c), and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, Plaintiff River Gas Corporation hereby petitions the District Court for
review by trial de novo of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Decision dated
October 6,2005, of the Utah State Tax Commission in River Gas Corp. v. Auditing Division of
the Utah State Tax Commission (Tax Commission Appeal No. 00-1159), attached hereto as
Exhibit A. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-505(1), Plaintiff has posted an Appeal Bond with
the Utah State Tax Commission for the full amount of the taxes, interest, and penalties at issue in
this matter. A copy of the Appeal Bond is attached to this Petition as Exhibit B.

#189715 vl

Pursuant to Rule 6-103(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Plaintiff requests
that this case be assigned to a tax judge.
DATED this 7th day of November, 2005.
HOLME ROBERTS^ OWEN LLP

lark EL Buck
Steven P. Young
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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EXHIBIT "A"

RECEIVED
OCT • 7 2005
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION
RIVER GAS CORP.,
Petitioner,

& o£e*°S?

) FINDINGS OF FACT,
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
) AND FINAL DECISION
)

v.
AUDITING DIVISION OF
THE UTAH STATE TAX
COMMISSION,

) Appeal No.
) Parcel No.
)
) Tax Type:
) Tax Period:

00-1159
N1605
Severance Tax
01/01/94 thru 12/31/98

)

Respondent

) Judge:

Davis

Presiding:
G. Blaine Davis, Administrative Law Judge
Palmer DePaulis, Commissioner
Marc B. Johnson, Commissioner
Appearances:
For Petitioner:

Mr. Mark Buchi,fromthe lawfirmof Holme Roberts & Owen
Mr. Steve Young, from the lawfirmof Holme Roberts & Owen
For Respondent: Mr. Clark Snelson, Assistant Attorney General
Mr. Craig Sandberg, Director, Auditing Division
Ms. Shelly Robinson,fromthe Auditing Division
Ms. Ingelise Goss,fromthe Auditing Division
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission for a Formal Hearing on

November 29,2004. After that full day, the hearing was continued until March 22,2005. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the parties requested permission to file briefe, together with proposed
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision. The last ofthose documents was received
on June 14, 2005. Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing and the
arguments thereon, the Tax Commission hereby makes its:

AppealNo. 00-1159

28. On August25,2000, the Division issued a Statutory Notice for 1he period January
1,1994throughDecember31,1998 in the amount of $376,583.56, plus interest of $69,408.09/ The
Statutory Notice allowed RGCs deduction of the QPC transportation costs, but disallowed RGCs
deduction for the costs of compression.
29. RGCfileda timely appeal to the Utah State Tax Commission which was assigned
Appeal No. 00-1159.
30. OnJune 1,2001, the Tax Commission issued a Scheduling OrdCT set in [sic] the
case for hearing on October 2,2001. It was discovered that the Commission inadvertently set the
hearing for one hour rather than afull day so the hearing was continued until January 2002. Upon
motion, this case was stayed by the Tax Commission pending a decision in an appeal filed by
ExxonMobil.
31. OnDecember 18,2001, the Tax Commission held a hearing in ExxonMobil on a
bifurcated factual and legal issue.
32. That decision was eventually appealed to the Utah Supreme Court which issued
an Opinion No. 20021023 dated November 25,2003.
33. That Opinion stated at ^24 "Although ExxonMobil is entitled to further
adjudication of its claim for a refund, as to other parties who may have refund requests, deficiency
proceedings, or similar matters pending before the Tax Commission, our holding is to apply
prospectively only."
1 Interest continues to accrue at the statutory rate.
-6-

AMENDED UTAH OIL AND GAS SJ£WERANG& TAX AUDIT SBSOtfAftY
JOVER-OAS CORPORATION
FaRTHEPERTOB
01/01/1999-1201/2000
tever^Sas CorporaSon
t09O P\&za Ofee Bldg
Ba/t!es\ftJfe,GK 74004

Account Number. N16G$
Shantfra Winters

Reference
ExhMA

I •Note- Interest Computed To»
I
Datiylafer^AmQaafc

Additional Tax

$mq%{mrr

Vemlty
SQJQ®

12&82D4
S&7.68

Jaterisst*
*14M72^&

Total Amount Due I
$7B&S0&46

|

PIT; I'j.'.ancaa—c i uu. -mi ,i *.i , .MI. .asawawMagssasa; , u i if

EXPLANATION OF AUDIT FINDINGS;

The following summaries Ifte severance tax ^djustrrjsnis
$272;(»1,89for^k3l
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AMENDED

UTAH OIL & GAS SEVERANCE TAX AUDIT SUMMARY
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY
FOR THE PERIOD
01/01/2001 -12/31/2001
Phillips Petroleum Company
960 Plaza Office Bldg
Bartlesville, OK 74004

I

Reference

J Exhibit A

*Note:
I

Interest Computed To:
Daily Interest Amount:

Report Date: 3/12/2004
Account Number N1475
Examining Officer
Shandra Winters

Additional Tax

Penalty

Interest*

Total Amount Due

$441,089.32

$0.00

$40,036.41

$481,125.73

03/12/04
$36.25

EXPLANATION OF AUDIT FINDINGS:
The following summarizes the severance tax adjustments.
1. Phillips Petroleum Company underreported product value. The company deducted electric power compression
and compression station expenses. These are not allowable deductions. Phillips was given allowable transportation costs.
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UTAH OIL AND GAS SEVERANCE TAX AUDIT SUMMARY
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY
FOR THE PERIOD
01/01/2002-12/31/2002
Phillips Petroleum Company
1110 Plaza Office Bidg.
Bartfesville, OK 74004

j

Interest

Rcferatce

Exhibit A
Payment made on 03/26/2008
Payment made on 04/09/2008
I Balance Due/(Credit)

I
t

Report Date: 4/22/2008
Account Number. N1475
Examining Officer:
Shandra Winters

*Note: Interest Computed To:
Daily Interest Amount:

$229,562.08
(5,377.76)
0.00
$224,184.32

$0.00
0.00
0.00
$0.00

$58,893.67
0.00
(1,324.92)
$57,668.75

05/22/08
$44.03

I^^AN^lP^
The following summarizes the oil and gas severance tax audit adjustments.
1. Phillips Petroleum Company (Phillips) deducted gathering costs from product value for entity number 11256 that were
not allowable transportation deductions for the 2002 tax year.

Pagelofl

Total Amount Due
$288,455.75
(5,377.76)
(1,324.92)
$281,753.07

AMENDED
UTAH OIL AND GAS SEVERANCE TAX AUDIT SUMMARY
CONOCOPHILLIPS COMPANY
FOR THE PERIOD
01/01/2003 -12/31/2005
ConocoPhillips Company
1090 Plaza Office Bldg
Bartlesville, OK 74004

Reference
Exhibit A
Payment made on 03/05/2007
Total
Interest from 03/05/07 to 04/27/07
Total Balance Due
*Note: Interest Computed To:
Daily Interest Amount

L_

Report Date: 4/12/2007
Account Number: N2335
Examining Officer
Randy M. Thackeray

Additional Tax

Penalty

Interest*

Total Amount Due

$216,584.31
($3,336.81)
$213,247.50
$0.00
$213,247.50

$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00
$0.00

$28,090.69
($431.14)
$27,659.55
$2,780.98
$30,440.53

$244,675.00
($3,767.95)
$240,907.05
$2,780.98
$243,688.03

05/12/07
$40.90

EXPLANATION OF AUDIT FINDINGS:

The following summarizes the oil and gas severance tax audit adjustments.
1. ConocoPhillips Company (ConocoPhillips) deducted transportation costs from product value for entity number 11256 that were
not allowable for the 2003 tax year.
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RECEIVE^
NOV 2 3 20Q*t
Before The Utah State Tax Commission
PETITION FOR REDETERMINATION
Petitioner (print or type)

Go

j Petitioner representative, if any (print or type)
Name
Mark Buchi or Steve Young

River Gas Corooration
D.B.A.

F,rm

Holme Roberts & Owen LLP

Mailing address 1090 Plaza Office Building
Bartiesville, OK 74004

Mailing address

Daytime telephone no.
FAX telephone no.
918-661-3509
918-661-4057
Account/FEIN/Social Security no. Property Parcel number
N1605
Tax Type and Primary Issue
This appeal involves (check any that apply)

FAX telephone no.
Daytime telephone no.
801-521-9639
| 801-521-5800
I authorize the above-named person to discuss r—i
this appeal with the Utah State Tax Commission. L J Y e s

• Sales/Use tax

D Individual income tax

D Penalty/Interest • Refund request

299 South Main Street, Suite 1800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

u

r-j

N0

(Provide estimated market value of property)

• Corporate Franchise tax

• Property tax $

• Motor vehicle or impound

09 Other (specify): Severance Tax

Tax year, audit period, or period under petition: 1999 - 2000
This appeal involves an assessment, decision, or action by:
I 8 Auditing Division

• Taxpayer Services Division

Q Property Tax Division

Q Motor Vehicle Division • Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division • Other (specify): Severance Tax
If this appeal results from a decision, letter, assessment, or notice issued by a Division of the Tax Commission, provide the date
of that action and the name and title of the person who took the action. (Attach a copy ot any letter or notice to this petition.)
Date: 11 / 0 8 / 0 4

Name and title: Craig Sandberg, Director, Auditing Division

If this appeal results from an impounded vehicle, provide the impound report number, license plate number and the
vehicle identification number (VIN).
License plate no.:

Impound report no.:

VIN:

Request For Relief
Describe the basis for your appeal and the relief that you seek from the Tax Commission (attach additional pages if necessary)
The basis for relief for this appeal is the same as in appeal No. 04-0316, which includes a severance tax appeal for the same petitioner for the
2001 tax year. The Auditing Division has violated Utah law by valuing River Gas' natural gas downstreamfromthe well rather than at the well
for severance tax purposes.

Matters that come before the Tax Commission are set for a hearing, unless the parties agree to pursue mediation or a decision on the record.
Check the "Yes" box for each option you agree with.
• Yes Are you interested in receiving information on our mediation program?
•

Yes Do you believe this matter can be decided on the record without a hearing? If you request a decision on the written record, it is
your responsibility to make sure all supporting documents, information, and legal authorities are submitted to the Appeals
Unit with this Petition For Redetermination. If you indicate a preference for a hearing on the record, this matter will be set
for a Telephone Status Conference so the presiding officer can make a decision on your request

Name (print or type)
Steve Young
Send Appeal Documents to: Utah State Tax Commission, Apj
210 North 1950 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84134
For assistance with this form, call: (801) 297-2280 or (801) 297-2281

TC-738 Rev. 10/04

MPR-03-2004

14:25

GLOBAL FINANCIAL SUCS

918 661 4057

Before The Utah State Tax Commission
PETITION FOR REDETERMINATION
Petitioner (Print or type)
Name

GwtoPJULUPs

&>«P/htY

STEMS

Firm
^

Gel forms online * tmLUUULgav,^?

Petitioner representative. It any (print or type)
Name

D.BA
Mailing address

P.02/03

._

Vctuifr

ffat-AtC ^DPZeTs 4- OlD&J LLP

\Malllng address

tfl SOUTH Mfoti Smesr, Sa\T£#l%oo
SAur LAKT &ry (Urtti frill I
Daytime telephone no.

^

Account/FEIN/Social Security no.

"WWfc *°*1

Daytime telephone no.

iProperty Parcel number

FAX telephone no. ^^

Attach signed authorization or power of attorney.

Tax Type and Primary Issue
This appeal Involves (check any that apply)

(Provide estimated market value of property)

D Sales/Use tax

D Individual income tax

d Corporate Franchise tax

D Property tax $„

13Penalty/Interest

•

D Motor vehicle or Impound

5 3 Other fsperifv): OU~4 €nA *

Refund request

S£Y£K/fo/6-T

TM

Tax year, audit period, or period under petition: _
This appeal Involves an assessment, decision, or action lay:
Ef Auditing Division

• Taxpayer Services Division

D Motor Vehicle Division •

•

Property Tax Division

Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division • Other (specify):

If this appeal results from a decision, letter, assessment, or notice issued by a Division of the Tax Commission, provide the date
of that action and the name and title of the person who took the action. (Attach a copy of any tetter or notice to this petition,)
Date;

Name and title:

_

If this appeal results from an impounded vehicle, provide the impound report number, license plate number and the
vehicle identification number (VIN).
License plate no.:.

Itnpound report no.:„

VIK:.

Request For Relief
Describe the basis for your appeal and the relief that you seek from the Tax Commission (attach additional pages if necessary)

Matters that come before the Tax Commission are setfora hearing, unless the parties aonee to pursue mediation or a decision on the record.
Check the "Yes" box for each option you agree with.
D Yes Are you interested in receiving information on our mediation program?
D Yes Do you believe this matter can be decided on the record without a hearing? [f you request a decision on the written record, it is
your responsibility to make sure ail supporting documents, information, end legal authorities ere submitted to the Appeals
Unit with this Petition for Redetermination, if you Indicate a preference for e hearing on the record, this matter will be set
for a Telephone Status Conference so the presiding officer can make e decision on your request
Name (print or type)

^

Send Appeal Documents to: Utah State Tax Commission, Appeals Unit
510 North 1950 West
Salt Lake City. Utah 84134
OS
For assistance Wth this form, calfc (801) 297-2280 or (801) 297-2281

MAR-03-2004

14:26

GLOBfiL FINANCIAL SUCS

Utah State Tax Commission
Appeals Division
210 North 1950 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84134-6200

918 661 4057

P.03/0Z

March 3,2004

PETITION FOR REDETERMINATION - REQUEST FOR RELIEF

ConocoPhillips requests that the Tax Commission abate the audit deficiency issued by
the Auditing Division. The issue in dispute is the proper means of valuing and taxing
coalbed methane production for severance lax purposes under Utah Code Ann, § 59-5101, et al. (2001). The Division contends that valuation should occur after gathering and
compression; at the point the coalbed methane enters the Qucstar pipeline. The Division
has thus not allowed ConocoPhillips to deduct its expensive compression costs from its
severance tax value. This Division position is in error because it contradicts Utah Code §
59-5-102(l)(a), which requires ConocoPhillips to pay severance tax based on a
percentage of value of gas "at the well." ConocoPhillips contends that its natural gas
should be valued "at the well," or, because this is a "severance tax," at the point of
severance, prior to gathering and compression.
ConocoPhillips'readingof the severance tax statute is especially appropriate given that it
is a taxing statute (rather than an exemption statute). "In case of doubt," taxing statutes
are "construed in favor of the taxpayer so as to avoid the levying of taxes by
imp]icatlon:'Belnorth Petroleum Corp. v. Tax Comm'n, 845 P2d 266, 271 n.8 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993) (holding that property tax reimbursements are not considered revenues for
purposes of determining "value at the well" for severance tax). If the Tax Commission
has any doubt about the meaning of Utabfs severance tax statutes, those doubts must be
construed in favor of ConocoPhillips and against the Auditing Division,
The Audit Division has allowed third party transportation cost of $ ,12/MCF for 2001.
Our petition asks for additional $ 21/MCF for compression and associated costs. Total
transportation of $ 31/MCF is not much to ask for if compared to conventional gas.
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Petitioner (print or type)
Name
Phillips Petroleum Company
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[Petitioner representative, if any (print or type)
11 authorize the below-named person to discuss and share information
I concerning this appeal with the Utah State Tax Commission.
Name
Mark K. Buchi or Steven P. Young
Firm
Holme Roberts & Owen LLP
(Mailing address 2 9 9 S o u l h M a j n S l r e e t ^ S u j t e 1 8 0 0

DLBA

Mailing address do D a v i d N , Breibeck
1110 Plaza Office Building
Bartlesviile. OK 74044

Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Daytime telephone no.
918-661-3509
Account/FEIN/Sociai Security no.

FAX telephone no.
918-661-0304
Property Parcel number

Daytime telephone no.
FAX telephone no.
801-521-5800
801-521-9639
Representative's email address
mark.buchi@hro.com
or
steve.young@hro.com

Petitioner's email address
David.N.Breibeck@conocophiHips.com
Tax Type and Primary issue
This appeal Involves (check any that apply)
•

Sales/Use tax

Q Individual income tax

•

Penalty/Interest Q Refund request

(Provide estimated market value of property)
Q Corporate Franchise tax

•

Property tax $

Q Motor vehicle or impound

IXl Other (specify!: Oil & Gas Severance Tax

Tax year, audit period, or period under petition: 1/1/02 -12/31/02

^

This appeal Involves an assessment, decision, or action by:
S Auditing Division
•

•

Motor Vehicle Division •

Taxpayer Services Division
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• Property Tax Division

APPEALS SECTION

Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division O Other (specify):

If this appeal results from a decision, letter, assessment, or notice issued by a Division of the Tax Commission, provide the date
of that action and the name and title of the person who took the action. (Attach a copy of arty letter or notice to this petition.)
Date: 04 / 2 2 / 0 8

Name and title: Craig Sandberg, Director, Auditing Division

If this appeal results from an impounded vehicle, provide the impound report number, license plate number and the
vehicle identification number (VIN).
License plate no.:.

Impound report no.:

VIN:

Request For Relief
Describe the basis for your appeal and the relief that you seek from the Tax Commission (attach additional pages if necessary)
ConocoPhinips requests that the deficiency be abated. The basis for relief is the same as in four other Tax Commission appeals relating to the
same issue for the same taxpayer for different periods: Appeal Nos. 00-1159 (1994-1998 period, pending before the Utah Second District Court
as case No. 060700437), 04-1378 (1999-2000 period, pending before the Tax Commission and stayed pending a final decision in the
1994-1998 Appeal), 04-0316 (2001 period, pending before the Tax Commission and stayed pending a final decision in the 1994-1998 Appeal),
and 07-0470 (2003 period, pending before the Tax Commission and set for a status conference on October 1,2008).
in all of these appeals, the Auditing Division has violated Utah law by valuing ConocoPhinips' natural gas downstream from the weU rather than
at the well for severance tax purposes.
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le (print)
(print)
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Taxpayer's signature
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jaxpayers
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84134
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PETITION FOR REDETERMINATION
Petitioner (print or type)
Name
ConocoPhililps Company
DBA

Petitioner representative, if any (print or type)
I authorize the below-named person to discuss and share information
concerning this appeal with the Utah State Tax Commission.
Name
Mark K. Buchi or Steven P. Young
Firm
Holme Roberts & Owen LLP
Mailing address 2 9 g s M a i n f suite #1800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Mailing address do D a v e N , Breibeck
1110 Plaza Office Bldg
Bartlesviile, OK 74004
FAX telephone no.
Daytime telephone no.
(918)661-3509
(918)661-0304
AccounVFEIN/Social Security no. Property Parcel number
N2335
Petitioner's email address
Dave. N.Breibeck@conocophiHips.com

Daytime telephone no.
FAX telephone no.
;(801)521-5800
(801)521-9639
Representative's email address
mark.buchi@hro.com or steve.young@hro.com

Tax Type and Primary Issue
This appeal Involves (check any that apply)
•

Sales/Use tax

D Individual income tax

D Penalty/Interest •

Refund request

(Provide estimated market value of property)
•

Corporate Franchise tax

•

Property tax $

•

Motor vehicle or impound

BB Other (specify): Oil & Gas Severance Tax

Tax year, audit period, or period under petition: 1/1/03 - 12/31/03
This appeal involves an assessment, decision, or action by:
H Auditing Division
•

• Taxpayer Services Division

Motor Vehicle Division •

Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division

•

Property Tax Division

•

Other (specify):

If this appeal results from a decision, letter, assessment, or notice issued by a Division of the Tax Commission, provide the date
of that action and the name and title of the person who took the action. (Attach a copy of any letter or notice to this petition.)
Date: 04 / 1 2 / 0 7

Name and title: Craig Sandberg, Director, Auditing Division

If this appeal results from an impounded vehicle, provide the impound report number, license plate number and the
vehicle identification number (VIN).
Impound report no.:.

License plate no.:.

VIN:

Request For Relief
Describe the basis for your appeal and the relief that you seek from the Tax Commission (attach additional pages if necessary)
ConocoPhiiiips requests that the deficiency be abated. While the audit period is 1/1/03 -12/31/05, the deficiency and appeal relate only to
2003. The basis for relief is the same as in three other Tax Commission appeals relating to the same issue for the same taxpayer for different
periods: Appeal nos. 00-1159 (1994-1998 period, pending before the Utah Second District Court as Case No. 060700437), 04-1378
(1999-2000 period, pending before the Tax Commission and stayed pending a final decision in the 1994-1998 Appeal), and 04-0316 (2001
period, pending before the Tax Commission and stayed pending a final decision in the 1994-1998 Appeal).
In all of these appeals, the Auditing Division has violated Utah law by valuing ConocoPhililps1 natural gas downstream from the well rather than
at the well for severance tax purposes.
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Send Appeal Documents to: Utah State Tax Commission, Appeals Unit
210 North 1950 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84134
For assistance with this form, call: (801) 297-2280 or (801) 297-2281
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CLARK L. SNELSON #4673
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF #4666
Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
P O Box 140874
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0874
Telephone: (801)366-0375
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RIVER GAS CORPORATION,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
v.

SUPPLEMENTAL ANSWERS TO
PETITIONER'S FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES, REQUESTS FOR
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS

UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
Case No. 060700437
Defendant/Respondent.
Judge Jon M. Memmott

Pursuant to the Court's Order dated October 19, 2006 granting Plaintiffs Motion to
Compel the specific answers to discovery, Respondent, the Utah State Tax Commission, hereby
submits supplemental discovery responses as ordered. In so doing, Respondent preserves any
and all objections as to the admissibility of the information produced. Respondent also notes
that this information is produced pursuant to direct Order of the Court which has been duly
informed as to the confidential nature of information presented and as to the statutory restrictions
on the dissemanation of such information. Having noted its ongoing objections and concerns

regarding the disclosure of the information the Respondent hereby submits responses to
interrogatories numbers 4 through 12, number 21, number 22, number 24, number 25 and
number 26 as well as responses to requests for admissions numbers 1 through 12 and requests for
production of documents numbers 6 and 7.
DEFINITIONS
In responding to these Interrogatories, particularly Interrogatories number 8 and 9, the
following definitions of specific terms have been relied on by the Utah State Tax Commission
and should be used in interpreting these responses.
1.

Gross Production - The amount of oil and gas produced by well, obtained form the Utah
Division of Oil, Gas & Mining, attributable to the applicable lands located in Utah.

2.

Stripper Well Production - No tax is imposed upon production from stripper wells as
defined under Section 59-5-101.

3.

Wildcat/Development Well Production - No tax is imposed upon the first six months of
production for development wells, and the first 12 months for wildcat wells, as defined
under Section 59-5-101.

4.

Exempt Royalty Production - Calculated at an estimated 15% rate against the volume
remaining after deducting stripper and wildcat/development well production.

5.

Average Price - Compiled from severance tax returns filed with the Utah State Tax
Commission.
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6.

Tax Rates - the tax amount is calculated by applying the applicable tax rates of 3% and
5% against the taxable value as directed under Section 59-5-102.

7.

Workover/Recompletion Credit - A tax credit of up to 20% for the expenses of a
workover or recompletion, approved by the Utah Division of Oil, Gas & Mining, is
allowed as a deduction. The tax credit is limited to $30,000 per well during each
calendar year.

8.

Allocation Percent - 33% of the new taxes from wells existing on or before June 30,
1996 and 80% of the taxes from new wells beginning production on or after July 1, 1996.
80% of taxes from new wells beginning production on or after January 1, 2001
attributable to interests on lands conveyed to the tribe under the Ute-Moab Land
Restoration Act.

9.

Allocation Percent - 33% of the new taxes from wells existing on or before June 30,
1996 and 80% of the taxes from new wells beginning production on or after July 1, 1996,
for Navajo Revitalization Fund.
RESPONSES TO INTERROGATORIES
4.

Identify the person or persons at the Tax Commission who have been responsible

for the period July 1, 1999 to the present to calculate the amounts deposited into the Uintah
Basin Revitalization Fund Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-116.
RESPONSE: Ken Petersen.
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5.

Identify the person or persons at the Tax Commission who have been responsible

for the period July 1, 1999 to the present to calculate the amounts deposited into the Navajo
Revitalization Fund pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-119.
RESPONSE: Ken Petersen.
6.

Identify all amounts deposited by the Tax Commission between July 1, 1999 and

the present into the Uintah Basin Revitalization Fund pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-116.
RESPONSE: A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
7.

$786,005
$1,845,337
$2,000,000
$1,686,135
$3,000,000
$3,000,000
$3,000,000

Identify all amounts deposited by the Tax Commission between July 1, 1999 and

the present into the Navajo Revitalization Fund pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-119.
RESPONSE: A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.

8.

$440,640
$1,485,251
$1,145,373
$939,401
$1,216,045
$1,451,427
$1,988,076

Identify as specifically as practicable how the amounts in Interrogatory #6 were

calculated.
RESPONSE: Gross production is reduced by stripper well production, wildcat/development
well production, and exempt royalty production to arrive at taxable volume.
4

Taxable volume is multiplied by the average price to determine taxable value. The tax
rates are applied to the taxable value to determine the total amount of severance tax. This
amount is then reduced by the applicable workover/recompletion credit to arrive at the total
severance tax paid. Then the appropriate allocation percent is applied to determine the amount
of severance taxes to be deposited into the Fund.
9.

Identify as specifically as practicable how the amounts in Interrogatory #7 were

calculated.
RESPONSE Gross production is reduced by stripper well production, wildcat/development
well production, and exempt royalty production to arrive at taxable volume.
Taxable volume is multiplied by the average price to determine taxable value. The tax
rates are applied to the taxable value to determine the total amount of severance tax. This
amount is then reduced by the applicable workover/recompletion credit to arrive at the total
severance tax paid. Then the appropriate allocation percent is applied to determine the amount
of severance taxes to be deposited into the Fund.
10.

For the period July 1, 2000 to November 30, 2003, identify the total amount on

your records of oil and gas production by year on lands the severance taxes from which were
deposited into the Navajo Revitalization Fund.
RESPONSE: The calculation is done on a calendar year basis, therefore the information
presented below is by calendar year.

5

11.

Oil (BBLS)
2000 5,608,571
2001 5,021,339
2002 4,731,507

Gas (MCF)
4,604,947
4,346,918
3,906,534

2003 4,145,103

3,663,620

For the period July 1, 2000 to November 30, 2003, identify the total amount on

your records of oil and gas production by year on lands the severance taxes from which were
deposited into the Uintah Basin Revitalization Fund.
RESPONSE: The records of the Utah State Tax Commission for severance taxes are kept on a
calendar year basis. The information presented below is by calendar year.

12.

Oil (BBLS)

Gas fMCF)

2000
2001
2002

2,290,085
2,090,550
2,051,743

32,693,536
42,456,262
50,582,713

2003

2,204,754

49,148,607

At the March 22, 2005 Formal Hearing before the Tax Commission in appeal no.

00-1159, Inge-Lise Goss testified at p. 330 of the transcript that from January 1, 2004 to
December 31, 2004, there was "an increase in the federal royalties monitored by the state" and
that state severance tax revenues "were up slightly, but not anywhere to that same magnitude" as
the federal royalties. Identify the specific federal royalty and state severance tax revenues
referenced by Ms. Goss and provide any and all information that supports her testimony
statement.
6

RESPONSE:

21.

Federal Royalties

Severance Tax

2003

$33,926,481

$26,745,279

2004

$63,033,708

$36,659,808

Identify how many severance tax refund claims are pending before the Tax

Commission.
RESPONSE. Ten.
22.

Identify the total amount of each severance tax refund claim pending before the

Tax Commission.
RESPONSE: $4,382,173.84.
24.

If the answer to Interrogatory #23 is yes, identify each such sale the Tax

Commission is aware.
RESPONSE: We are aware that title to 116,512,780 MCF of gas was transferred at wellhead
meters for the period of 1994 through 2005. This equates to $424,940,189 in value.
25.

For each sale identified in Interrogatory #24, identify whether the taxpayer

utilized the value at the wellhead meter for severance tax purposes.
RESPONSE: Yes.
26.

For each sale identified in Interrogatory #24, identify whether the Auditing

Division accepted the value at the wellhead meter utilized by the taxpayer as the appropriate
value under Utah law.
RESPONSE. Yes.
7

REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION
1

Admit that severance tax refunds issued by the Tax Commission are issued from

the General Fund of the State of Utah.
RESPONSE: Tax Commission refunds are issued by State Finance. Severance tax refunds are
issued from the General Fund of the State of Utah.
2.

Admit that for the period July 1, 1999 to the present, when the Tax Commission

refunded severance taxes to taxpayers, the Tax Commission did not seek reimbursement for any
portion of such refunds from the Uintah Basin Revitalization Fund or the Navajo Revitalization
Fund.
RESPONSE. Respondent admits that it has not sought reimbursement from the Revitalization
Funds during the period in question.
3.

Admit that the calculation of "taxes collected" under Utah Code section 59-5-116

is based on oil and gas severance tax collections minus oil and gas severance tax refunds for the
present year.
RESPONSE: Deny.
4.

Admit that the calculation of "taxes collected" under Utah Code section 59-5-119

is based on oil and gas severance tax collections minus oil and gas severance tax refunds for the
present year.
RESPONSE: Deny.
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5.

Admit that severance tax refunds issued by the Tax Commission will have no

impact on the amount of money deposited into the Uintah Basin Revitahzation Fund if the $3
million cap in Utah Code section 59-5-116(2) is reached.
RESPONSE Respondent admits that if the cap is reached that severance tax refunds would not
affect the amount of money deposited into the fund.
6.

Admit that the S3 million dollar cap was reached for the Uintah Basin

Revitahzation Fund for fiscal years 2003-2004 and 2004-2005.
RESPONSE: The Revitahzation Funds are calculated on a calendar year basis because the
severance tax is reported and paid on a calendar year. For calendar years 2003, 2004, and 2005
the $3 million dollar cap was reached.
7.

Admit that severance tax refunds issued by the Tax Commission will have no

impact on the amount of money deposited into the Navajo Revitahzation Fund if the $2 million
cap in Utah Code section 59-5-119(2) is reached.
RESPONSE. Admit.
8.

Admit that a portion of the severance taxes at issue in tax Commission case no.

00-0901, and which were paid by ExxonMobil from July 1, 1997 to December 31, 1998, were
deposited by the Utah State Tax Commission into the Navajo Revitahzation Fund pursuant to
Utah Code section 59-5-119.
RESPONSE. Respondent admits that a portion of the taxes paid by ExxonMobil for the period
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in question were eventually credited to the Navajo Revitalization Fund. However, the Tax
Commission does not technically deposit directly into the fund.
9.

Admit that the Utah State Tax Commission issued a severance tax refund in the

amount of $2,168,334.87, plus interest, to ExxonMobil between November^21, 2005 and January
9, 2006 pursuant to the Tax Commission decision in case number 00-0901 dated November 21,
2005.
RESPONSE: Admit.
10.

Admit that the severance tax refund referenced in Request for Admission #9 was

paid from the General Fund of the State of Utah.
RESPONSE: Admit.
11.

Admit that no portion of the severance tax refund referenced in Request for

Admission #9 was paid out of Navajo Revitalization Fund funds.
RESPONSE. Admit that the refund check was issued solely by the State of Utah by State
Finance.
12.

Admit that no portion of the severance tax refund referenced in Request for

Admission #9 reduced the appropriation provided by Utah Code section 59-5-119.
RESPONSE: Respondent admits that no portion of the refund referred to in Admission number
9 reduced the appropriation provided by Utah Code Ann. § 59-5-119.
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REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
6.

Produce all documents showing how the amounts m Interrogatory No 6 were

calculated
RESPONSE: See attached.
7

Produce all documents showing how the amounts in Interrogatory No. 7 were

calculated.
RESPONSE: See attached.
DATED this #*ir

day of December, 2006.

Clark L. Snelson
Assistant Attorney General

Shelley Robj%on
Utah State Tax Commission
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